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ABSTRACT: In this paper I explore the possibilities of acknowledging the argumentative character of 
(at least some cases of) narration. Two basic models will be revised: 1) primary (core) narratives, 
regarding issues and facts under discussion, which may work as implicit arguments about the 
coincidence between discourse and reality via their own internal plausibility and 2) secondary 
narratives, imaginatively inserted in discourse, and serving as evidence for diverse lines of (either 
stated or unstated) analogical or exemplary argumentation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Or again what difference is there between a proof <probatio> and a statement of 
facts <narratio> save that the latter is a proof put forward in continuous form, while 
a proof is a verification of the facts coherent with the statement?1 
 
In this intriguing passage of the Institutio oratoria, Quintilian questions the neat, 
substantial and functional distinction between the narrative and argumentative 
parts of legal speeches, somehow challenging one of our best established intuitions 
as presented in informal logic textbooks regarding the task of identifying arguments. 
This paper is an essay within a bigger project aiming at revising the interest, for 
argumentation theory, in taking a closer look at the argumentative virtues of non-
explicitly-argumentative discourse, i.e. of (merely) narrative, descriptive or 
expository discourse, the usual suspects of nonargument types (Govier, 52001, p. 
14).2 As I have come to realize, it is an endeavour that is, for many different reasons, 
engaging now a number of scholars in our field and for which it seems to be ready. 
                                                        
1 “Aut quid inter probationem et narrationem interest nisi quod narratio est probationis continua 
propositio, rursus probatio narrationi congruens confirmatio?” Quintilian (1985), Inst. or. IV.2.79. I have 
used two translations of Quintilian published in the collection Loeb Classics: H.E. Butler’s (1980/1985) 
and D.A. Russell’s (2001). Depending on the paragraph I have found a better and more useful translation 
in either of those. I will cite the source in each case. 
2 Although T. Govier herself has recently tried to account for the possibility of reconstructing 
parables and other brief narrations as potential arguments (Govier & Ayers, 2012), this is done with 
a rather reluctant spirit and with the final conclusion that: “One can offer arguments through 
narrative, but doing that has more risks than benefits, from an epistemic point of view”.  
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 In fact, my interest in this type of inquiry began with a personal examination, 
for very particular and rather unrelated reasons, of the attention paid by ancient 
Latin rhetorical textbooks to narratio as a canonical speech part ‒especially 
important and significant in the case of legal speeches, according to the traditional 
division of rhetoric into speech genres. This research resulted in the publication first 
of a selection of the more relevant Latin texts with their Spanish translations 
(Olmos, 2011) and then of a more elaborated commentary and assessment of the 
particular precepts presented by these texts, and of the coincidences and variety 
found in them about this particular aspect in rhetorical tradition (Olmos, 2012). In 
this paper I will use material from these previous works, although my intention is to 
draw on them in order to make certain claims useful for contemporary theory of 
argumentation.  
 
2. THE TRADITION ABOUT LEGAL NARRATIO 
 
In the Latin classical and post-classical rhetoricians, I discovered an extremely rich, 
nuanced and at times contentious and diversified account of the argumentative 
interest of the narratives included in persuasive speeches. Such an interest 
determined the inevitability for the rhetorician to offer instructions and precepts 
about the way to construe sufficiently good and adequate, i.e. persuasive 
narrationes. The traditional triad ‒clarity, brevity, and plausibility‒3 of the 
rhetorical virtues (normative standards for achieving persuasion) demanded from 
narration is rather well known, but there are other important and more 
sophisticated contributions that could profitably be revised. For example, the 
preparatory role ‒expressed by the Greek term proskataskeuos or the Latin 
praestructivus‒ assigned by Quintilian (Inst. or., IV.2.54-57) or Fortunatianus (Artis 
rhetoricae, II.20)4 to narration, as preceding the explicitly argumentative part of 
legal speeches;5 or Cicero’s (De inv., 30) characteristic golden rule for a legal party or 
side narration, which acts, in fact, as a contextualized limit to the application of the 
virtuous triad: 
 
The narrative is not presented in the manner required by the case when a point 
which helps the opponent is explained clearly and elegantly, or a point which helps 
the speaker is presented obscurely and carelessly,6  
                                                        
3 The triad is of Greek origin: a statement of facts should be brief (syntomon), clear (saphes) and 
plausible (pithanon). Quintilian attributes this triad to Isocrates and his followers (Inst. or., IV.2.31). 
In Latin, except for brief, which is always brevis, we find certain terminological variations: clear might 
be lucida, dilucida, perspicua, manifesta, besides the more extended aperta; plausible, might as well be 
veri similis, or credibilis, in addition to the more widespread probabilis. 
4 Fortunatianus’ text is in Halm (ed.), 1863, pp. 79-134. The comments on narration occupy pages 
110-113. See, Olmos, 2012. 
5 It is a very interesting idea which is taken on by several rhetorical texts, but it is never truly 
developed. It could be well worth revising in subsequent papers. 
6 “Non quemadmodum causa postulat, narratur, cum aut id, quod adversario prodest, dilucide et 
ornate exponitur aut id, quod ipsum adiuvat, obscure dicitur et neglegenter.” Cicero (1976), De. Inv., 
I.30. 
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A golden rule that was assumed, repeated, and commented by most Latin later 
rhetoricians, although noticeably mocked by a rather original Quintilian:  
 
If anyone needs to be told to avoid damaging or inconsistent points in a narrative, it 
is pointless trying to teach him the rest, although some textbook writers produce 
this piece of advice as a secret unearthed by their own wisdom.7  
  
As to the either relatively or absolutely different character or treatment of the 
narrative discourse with respect to the argumentative one, which is our main point 
of interest here, these ancient textbooks contain a variety of alternatives. Thus, 
Marius Victorinus’ decided differentiation (Explanationum in rhetoricam M. Tullii 
Ciceronis, I.19)8 which attributes rational persuasion (fides) to the argumentative 
part and emotional adherence (adfectus) to the narrative part,9 contrasts with 
Quintilian’s (and, in general, the rest of the Latin rhetorician’s) much more nuanced 
approach, as evidenced in the quotation at the head of this paper.  
There seems to be, nevertheless, a widespread interest (a strategy common 
to all) in making relevant distinctions between different kinds of narratives usually 
found in legal speeches and which may or may not deserve a different treatment in 
this respect. Thus, Quintilian, on one hand, is willing to acknowledge, in several 
aspects, the argumentative interest of the narration “containing the cause under 
judgement”, but in this case he is also counting on the fact that the material exposed 
in it will be revised, reconstructed and, bit by bit justified in the confirmation part or 
proof, properly speaking. He thinks, nevertheless, that both elements are always 
necessary,10 both share the goal of persuasion and there is a kind of redundancy 
between them (the narration as the proof “put forward in continuous form”) which 
is finally beneficial. On the other hand, he also mentions the kind of narrative 
inserted in a legal speech but not exactly dealing with “the cause under judgement”, 
the so-called digressio type, which is there precisely for argumentative purposes 
                                                        
7 “Nam id quidem, ne qua contraria aut repugnantia in narratione dicamus? Si cui praecipiendum est, 
is reliqua frustra docetur, etiam si quidam scriptores artium hoc quoque tamquam occultum et a se 
prudenter erutum tradunt.” Quintilian (2001), Inst. or., IV.2.60. 
8 Marius Victorinus’ text is in Halm (ed.), 1863, pp. 153-304. 
9 Halm (ed.), 1863, pp. 201-208. 
10 Even in cases where other rhetoricians recommend avoiding narration. See especially Quintilian 
(2001), Inst. or. IV.2.66: “Since we have now inadvertently arrived at the more difficult kind of 
narratives, let us now speak of those in which the facts are against us. Some have held that, in this 
case, the narrative should be omitted. Nothing is easier –except of course not taking the cause on at 
all! But if you do take on a case of this kind for some good reason, what sort of art is it that admits the 
weakness of a cause by silence? Or is the judge going to be stupid enough to give judgement in line 
with something which he knows you did not want to put before him>?” (“Sed quatenus etiam forte 
quadam pervenimus ad difficilius narrationum genus, iam de iis loquamur in quibus res contra nos 
erit: quo loco nonnulli praetereundam narrationem putaverunt. Et sane nihil est facilius nisi prorsus 
totam causam omnino non agere. Sed si aliqua iusta ratione huiusmodi susceperis litem, cuius artis 
est malam esse causam silentio confiteri? Nisi forte tam hebes futurus est iudex ut secundum id 
pronuntiet quod sciet narrare te noluisse.” 
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(Inst. or., IV.2.15-17). Of these, Julius Severianus (Praecepta artis rhetoricae, §7)11 
explicitly says that they do not contain the matter of the litigious question, but are 
“put forward as arguments or placed among the arguments.”12 
 
3. STRUCTURAL AND PRAGMATIC CRITERIA 
 
Now, all these suggestions encourage us to go beyond the standard way of 
disregarding narrative discourse as simply non-argumentive. We see, moreover, 
that there is a possibility to analyze the relative argumentative character of 
narratives (and the particular way that argumentative character is put to work) in 
relation to a contextual assessment of what is or is not in question, is or is not 
brought for argumentative purposes, in a given situation. 
This strategy reminds us of the one used in informal logic to differentiate 
between argumentation and explanation. In contrast with the standard discounting 
treatment of the kind of discourse where, in principle, no explicit and recognizable 
“support” between statements is found (namely “descriptions, jokes, stories, 
exclamations, questions”, Govier, 52001, pp. 12-14), informal logic textbooks usually 
dedicate some paragraphs to the discrimination of arguments and explanations, for 
it is usually admitted that this is a distinction which is not so easy to make, as 
discursive means of explicit support between statements are used in both cases.13 
The main key is whether the (explicitly stated, suggested, or just pointed at) claim or 
conclusion is or is not contextually in question for the arguer and her 
interlocutor(s). It is not unusual, by the way, to find clarifying examples with a 
contrast between possible future events, obviously undetermined, which an 
argumentation may justify, and known and shared past or evidently present events, 
which may ask for an explanation. Of course, there could also be unknown or yet 
undetermined past events –which is the usual context of legal speeches as conceived 
by classical rhetoricians. 
So, here a structural criterion is first used to define argumentation: the 
evidently suggested or better explicit presence of discursive means of support 
between reasons and claims, but then a pragmatic criterion (what is contextually in 
question) is used to somehow discard explanations. Some have found it more 
                                                        
11 Julius Severianus’ text is in Halm (ed.), 1863, pp. 353-370. 
12 “The narrative is the presentation of the case made in the manner required by the cause: the 
exposition that is not directly issued from the case, instead <…> cannot be simply considered a 
narrative, but the presentation of a circumstance  which helps to build the case but does not contain 
the matter of the litigious question, but is put forward as an argument or among the arguments” 
(“Narratio insinuatio est totius causae, quem ad modum facta est: expositio vero quae non de causa 
nascitur <...> non potest videri narratio, sed expositio alicuius rei, quae causam adiuvat nec dat 
quaestioni materiam, sed pro argumento ponitur vel inter argumenta.”) Halm (ed.), 1863, pp. 358-
359. 
13 “Some passages seem to be classified either as arguments or as explanations, depending on what 
you assume about the situation or contexts in which they are made,” Govier (52001, p. 22). 
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coherent to stick to the structural criterion. H. Marraud (2007) does this.14 After 
exposing the contrast between argumentation and description as different kinds of 
speech acts in structural terms (acknowledging, though, the practical difficulties for 
a neat distinction in real cases with characteristic long texts,)15 he presents the 
additional contrast between “justification” and “explanation” as two different uses 
for argumentation, admitting the existence of both justificatory and explanatory 
arguments. In any case, here I will explore the more suggestive alternative to start 
with the pragmatic criterion and then see with what different discursive means we 
contribute to fill the contextually opened “space of reasons”. If we do it this way, 
certain narratives and descriptions, in the adequate context, would be considered 
closer to arguments than are explanations and the sense of the gradation towards 
unquestionable argument would change. 
Now, allow me again to borrow from older (though not so old this time) texts 
and traditions to present this very possibility. Rudolph Agricola’s [1444-1485] De 
inventione dialectica,16 chap. II.16, acknowledges, in principle, that there are two 
basic types of discourse which may be differentiated and which he calls: expositio 
and argumentatio. But his initial way of discriminating between them is explicitly 
pragmatic and based on the contextual attitude of the (either already won over or 
doubtful) audience and the arguer’s conscience about this:  
 
Now, a discourse may just aim at presenting the object, whatever it is, about which it 
talks, sure of the commitment and opinion of those who listen to it, or be intended 
for obtaining the persuasion of a hesitant audience. The former is done through 
exposition, the latter through argumentation.17 
 
For Agricola, moreover, these alternative procedures should not be identified with the 
characteristic parts of the perfect oratio as defined by the rhetorical tradition 
(preamble, narration, confirmation and epilogue): narration may include arguments 
and confirmation, the exposition of facts and, of course, both can appear in the 
preamble or the epilogue.18 It is the actual presence of the intention to persuade an 
audience about something which, in a particular context, cannot be assumed as 
directly evident or assumed, that will determine there being an argumentation. For 
example, Agricola claims that the following passage from the Aeneid (II, 130-1) is 
argumentative:  
                                                        
14 Johnson (2000, p. 123) also mentions the definition of argument provided by Thomas (1973): “an 
argument is a sentence or sequence of sentences containing statements some of which are set forth 
as supporting, making probable or explaining others,” which would as well include explanations. 
15 Marraud (2007, pp. 21-26).  
16 The writing of this text is dated around 1479. It was first printed in Louvain in 1515, but its most 
successful edition, by Agricola’s pupil, Alardus of Amsterdam, was printed in Köln, in 1539, and is the 
basis of the modern critical text, edited by L. Mundt (Agricola, 1992 [1539]), from which all 
quotations. 
17 “Sic et oratio aut satis habet explicare rem de qua dicit, cuiusmodi sit, secura fidei opinionisque 
eius qui audit, aut talem esse pervincere etiam renitente auditore conatur. Illud expositione fit, istud 
argumentatione”, Agricola, 1992 [1539], p. 302. 
18 Agricola (1992 [1539], p. 302). 
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Assensere omnes et quae sibi quisque timebat, 
Unius in miseri exitium conversa tulere. 
 
John Dryden’s translation (1697) of this passage verges towards, at least, the 
explicative by means of the characteristic apposition of the second clause:  
 
All praised the sentence, please’d the storm should fall 
On one alone, whose fury threaten’d all’.  
 
Theodore C. Williams’ version (1910) chooses, instead to separate completely both 
clauses by a stop, what makes it more purely expository:  
 
Nor did one voice oppose. The mortal stroke 
horribly hanging o’er each coward head 
was changed to one man’s ruin,  
and their hearts endured it well.19 
 
But Agricola justifies his argumentative analysis not in such kind of linguistic traits but 
in the assessment of the pragmatic context in which the verses are inserted and in 
which he feels there is a question to be answered. According to Agricola, the poet 
wants to convince us of the fact that all had sincerely assented (something about 
which, he thinks, we could be in doubt) and his proof consist of giving us the 
psychological reason for this sudden agreement. It liberates them from fear, 
concentrating all misery upon one individual: “What could be more convincing of their 
collective assent than the fact that it would offer them security?”20, says Agricola. The 
passage, though, bears no structural sign of including an argumentation or inference. It 
is an example of what Agricola calls an argumentation cast into an exposition: 
“sometimes we find an argument presented as an exposition.”21 And that is the 
interesting part for us, regardless of what we may think of the clarity or adequacy of 
the particular example chosen. 
Agricola’s pragmatic criterion is moreover refined in a successive classification 
of different types of exposition with an increasing argumentative import, arriving thus 
at a real gradual theory of argument.22 There are, in this sense three “degrees” of 
exposition verging towards argument. A speaker, a writer, can use “structurally” 
discursive exposition in order to: a) please an audience; b) simply to develop a 
sequence of events or finally c) to seek conviction through the manifest plausibility of 
                                                        
19 Both translations are offered in the Perseus web page: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/  
20 “Quo magis enim potuisset probare omnes assensisse, quam quod gaudebat securitate sua?”, 
Agricola, 1992 [1539], p. 306. 
21 “videtur nonnunquam in expositione venire argumentatione”, Agricola, 1992 [1539], p. 304. 
22 P. Mack (1993, pp. 191-2) has characterized these distinctions between the different degrees of 
exposition as: “a matter of linguistic texture [...] the distinction depends on the presence or absence 
of connections between the sentences, on the density of the material and on the vehemence of the 
expression”. In my opinion, though, such stylistic criteria are clearly and explicitly subordinated by 
Agricola to the real conditions of discursive use, and the different positions of speaker and audience 
regarding the contents of speech. 
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what is presented; and this is called probabilis expositio. With this classification 
Agricola is defending a kind of gradual continuum from mere exposition seeking mere 
pleasure, passing through a more attentively organized and ordered narrative, to 
plausible exposition with persuasive ends and finally (chapters II.18-21) explicit (both 
discursively and pragmatically speaking) argumentation, in which we will identify 
certain traditionally assessed forms of argument (namely, in the case of Agricola, the 
traditional four: induction, syllogism, example and enthymeme). 
Now, the third degree of exposition, allegedly the more interesting in 
argumentative terms, complies with the pragmatic criterion for argumentation. It 
would be typically delivered in a setting where the matters exposed are somehow in 
question or, at least undetermined, and the audience is expecting to be reassured and 
convinced, i.e. is expecting reasons to be so. But the terms of the classification also help 
us in another respect as they point out to the specific discursive means of persuasion 
used in the case of expositio, which differ from explicit support between statements, i.e. 
from what is indubitable argumentatio. A concept, that of explicit “support”, which is, 
by the way, also present in Agricola’s text as distinctive of the more evident and 
traditionally acknowledged cases of argument: “We call argumentation that <sc. kind 
of discourse> which at the same time contains what we want to prove and the 
invented <sc. grounds> on which we try to prove it.”23 
The specific means of persuasion used by exposition (description, narration) 
when presented in the adequate pragmatic situation for argumentative purposes is its 
manifest (intended, proposed and emphasized by the arguer; expected and scrutinized 
by her audience) probabilitas, credibility or plausibility.  
 
4. NARRATIVE PROBABILITAS 
 
This is not the relative plausibility (in terms of reasonableness) accorded to a specific 
argumentative scheme among the usually acknowledged relations of inference (logical, 
causal, normative). It is a more distributed concept in which the pieces support each 
other in a kind of unstable balance, until the assessment is given to the whole and the 
audience finds a “credible account”. This idea is more or less equivalent to what 
Plumer (2011) uses in his assessment of narrative fiction (novels, in his case) as 
potential arguments about the real world: “Believability is the central element”. 
So what we need in order to evaluate narration as argument, given the 
adequate pragmatic context, is a theory of what such distributed 
credibility/believability amounts to. Agricola has his own (characteristically triadic) 
one: probabilitas is obtained by means of an exposition which is “rich in argumentative 
content” (argumentosa), “consistent with phenomena” (consentanea rebus) and “free 
from contradiction” (per se consequens).24 But also Cicero (De inv. I.29) had presented 
his own, extremely influential one, when commenting on the third and most important 
of the narrative virtues, namely, that same probabilitas:  
                                                        
23 “Id vero, quo simul complectimur rem, quam probare volumus, et illud inventum, quo probare 
conamur, eam argumentationem esse dicimus”, Agricola (1992 [1539], p. 314).  
24 “Probabilis fit expositio, si sit argumentosa, si consentanea rebus, si per se consequens”, Agricola 
(1992 [1539], p. 350). 
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The narrative will be plausible if it seems to embody characteristics which are 
accustomed to appear in real life; if the proper qualities of the characters are 
maintained, if reasons for their actions are plain, if there seems to have been ability 
to do the deed, if it can be shown that the time was opportune, the space sufficient 
and the place suitable for the events about to be narrated; if the story fits in with the 
nature of the actors in it, the habits of the ordinary people and the beliefs of the 
audience. Verisimilitude can be secured by following these principles.25 
 
That our narrative should embody the usual characteristics of real life, that it be 
consentanea rebus, seems to be the main point in both cases, although we see that 
Cicero develops a sense of what is consistent with reality which takes in account the 
effective beliefs of the audience. Something which is interestingly emphasized by 
Marius Victorinus in his commentary: 
 
But Cicero, while taking in account the nature of the facts and the times and agents 
involved, adds an eighth26 element which is opinion, and rightly so; because things 
taken as a whole are not valid just per se, nor on account of their nature alone, but 
through the mediation of opinion.27 
 
These formulae might seem somehow naïve to us, but in any case they try to provide 
what is needed, i.e. a normative theory of narrative plausibility. Plumer (2011, pp. 
1554-1555), on his part, thinking about fiction and its aiming at verisimilitude to 
attain believability, talks about an “internal coherence” (that events in the narrative 
be fully connected) and an “external coherence” (that they also “cohere with our 
widely shared assumptions about how human psychology and society […] work”).  
But Plumer also makes an assumption with which I cannot fully agree and 
through which he restricts these ideas to fictional narratives. He says: “The novel 
aims at verisimilitude, while nonfictional narration (history, biography, etc.) aims at 
veracity”. And so, all his proposals about the argumentative character of novels 
would not really be applicable in the case of nonfiction. This idea has a long tradition 
and is also, somewhat surprisingly, present in Agricola, who attributes his second 
species of exposition (in which a sequence of events is developed) paradigmatically 
to history, stating, moreover, that the historian just tells the truth, however 
implausible, not really caring to convince the reader of it: “they <sc. historians> do 
not feel they should consider diligently how to convince their readers of what they 
                                                        
25 Cicero (1976), De inv. I.29: “Probabilis erit narratio, si in ea videbuntur inesse ea, quae solent 
apparere in veritate; si personarum dignitates servabuntur; si causae factorum exstabunt; si fuisse 
facultates faciundi videbuntur; si tempus idoneum, si spatii satis, si locus opportunus ad eandem 
rem, qua de re narrabitur, fuisse ostendetur; si res et ad eorum, qui agent, naturam et ad vulgi morem 
et ad eorum, qui audient, opinionem accommodabitur. Ac veri quidem similis ex his rationibus esse 
poterit.” 
26 The loose enumeration made by Cicero of the objective elements of a narrative was traditionally 
systematized in the so called “seven circumstances”: agent (who), fact (what), cause (why), place 
(where), time (when), mode (how), and faculty or capacity (what with). 
27 “Verum Cicero rerum ac temporum personarumque considerans naturam, addidit aliis omnibus 
octavam opinionem, et recte. Res enim omnes non per se sunt neque ex natura valent, sed opinione.” 
Halm (ed.), 1863, p. 207. 
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convey to them.”28 And this is said in stark contrast with what happens with the 
third species of exposition, attributed to orators and philosophers, where “it is not 
enough that what is put forward should be true. It also needs to be firm and bring 
conviction by itself.”29 
The most extreme account of this idea about historical writing I have ever 
found is the famous late renaissance logician Jacopo Zabarella’s [1533-1589] 
contention, made in his treatise On the Nature of Logic (De natura logicae, Venice, 
1578), that history is the lowest possible kind of discipline or research field (below 
poetics, explicitly) as it uses neither logic nor reasoning: “but History does not 
examine any issue, but is a mere narration of facts, which has no artifice <sc. no 
logical art> in it.”30 What takes us again to a vision of narration, of historical, 
allegedly truthful, narration at least, as a mere apposition of statements with no 
support between them and no need at all of either punctual or distributed 
plausibility.  
But I do not find these ideas at all realistic about what the practice of the 
chronicler, either historical or journalistic, is about. There have always been 
competing accounts of facts and historians and chroniclers have had to try and be 
believable, in the terms we have been reviewing here, much more in the case of 
strange or unbelievable events. Truthfulness is, surely, a (defeasible) presumption 
in nonfictional narration. And faced with it, we are also encouraged to presume that, 
in Quintilian terms (Inst. or., II.4.2), it will be “tanto robustior quanto uerior” 
(“appear more solid as it is more truthful”). But this is not always so easy to achieve, 
as we all know, and so, nonfictive narrations in the adequate context ‒given the 
pragmatic conditions of a speaker willing to make her narrative version prevail and 
an audience expecting her to try it‒ could be analysed as argumentative and their 
plausibility be weighted according to our (prospective) theory of narrative 
verisimilitude.31 
                                                        
28 “neque sollicite quaerendum putent, quomodo fiat lectori eorum quae recensent”, Agricola (1992 
[1539], p. 347). 
29 “non satis est esse vera, quae exponentur, sed et firma et velut fidem sibi ipsis facientia oportet 
esse”, Agricola (1992 [1539], p. 348). 
30 Zabarella (1966 [1597], col. 100-101). 
31 Quintilian, while giving precedence to legal narratio as the privileged situation to treat narratives 
in argumentative terms (that’s why the quotations we have been using come from chapter 2 in Book 
IV, which deals with legal discourse), yet, in a previous classification of narrations (Book II, chap. 4) 
talks about other genres: “Now there are three forms of narrative, without counting the type used in 
actual legal cases. First, there is the fictitious narrative as we get it tragedies and poems, which is not 
merely not true but has little resemblance to truth. Secondly, there is the realistic narrative as 
presented by comedies, which, though not trae, has yet a certain verisimilitude. Thirdly, there is the 
historical narrative, which is an exposition of actual fact. Poetic narratives are the property of the 
teacher of literature <grammaticus>. The rhetorician therefore should begin with the historical 
narrative, whose force is in proportion to its truth” (“Et quia narrationum, excepta qua in causis 
utimur, tris accepimus species, fabulam, quae uersatur in tragoediis atque carminibus non a ueritate 
modo sed etiam a forma ueritatis remota, argumentum, quod falsum sed uero simile comoediae 
fingunt, historiam, in qua est gestae rei expositio, grammaticis autem poeticas dedimus: apud 
rhetorem initium sit historica, tanto robustior quanto uerior.”), Quintilian (1980), Inst. or., II.4.2. As 
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Another parallel, apparently of a more psychological character, between 
certain fictive (allegedly the most sophisticated) and non-fictive narratives is their 
exploitation of the persuasive efficacy of implicitness. Plumer insist that, in 
opposition to fables, parables and other genres which by definition “have a point” 
i.e. lead to a conclusion and are more easily identified as arguments (Hunt, 2009; 
Govier & Ayers, 2012): “if indeed a novel can be an argument, it would have to be 
indirectly or implicitly conveyed. For otherwise, the piece’s literary status […] would 
be called into question” (Plumer, 2011, p. 1553). I have also claimed (Olmos, 2012, 
p. 64, note 8) that, in certain settings, narrative accounts of reality, admittedly 
proposed as plausible versions of it, work better if there is no explicit protestation of 
veracity. 32 I will just try to support this intuition with a particular experience. Some 
years ago, we had a TV news presenter in Spain who chose to finish all his 
broadcasting programmes with the sententious and fully unrequested claim that 
“such were the facts, and so have we told them to you.” For a large sector of the 
audience this made him precisely highly suspicious of manipulation. The basic and 
extremely naturalized mechanism of trying to achieve conviction through a 
plausible account in the adequate pragmatic situation makes both vacuous and 
suspect the express articulation of the aimed at conclusion. 
 I’m not suggesting at all that history and fiction work in the same way, 
although certain specific kind of narrative plausibility, based on the assumed 
notions about what is usual in “real” o “experienced” life, might be essential in both. 
But they are precisely better distinguished if we analyse them in argumentative 
terms. In fiction ‒at least the paradigmatic, realistic fiction envisaged in Plumer’s 
paper‒, the believability and coherence of the fiction is put forward as a means to 
persuade the readers that certain principles operating in it are applicable in real life, 
and so a concrete argument about e.g. the consequences of a line of conduct or of a 
social position, is proposed in analogical terms. That would be the thesis or message 
of such a fictional work, verisimilitude making plausible the analogy. 
In non-fictive narratives there would be no real analogy traced because we 
do not have two realms to make a parallel, and that is why it is more difficult to see 
them as argumentative. But if the pragmatic criterion applies and these narratives 
are discursive means to make us decide about facts under discussion, their 
believability would be put forward just in order to defend their being good (the best 
available) portraits of reality. There would be no further message and the conclusion 
would be just something like “this is really what happened”. Veracity, initially a 
presumption, would be the desired conclusion, achieved through verisimilitude. 
  Of course, we may also use real events and not only fiction to support all 
kinds of conclusions in more or less explicit argumentative moves that would be, in 
such case, more exemplary than analogical. These narratives would also bear a 
further message and their conclusion would not be the story’s veracity alone. That is 
why I suggest that our classification of different kinds of narratives according to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
we see, history is already the realm of the rhetorician what means it should be assessed in rhetorical 
and argumentative terms.  
32 I would say that the legal requirement for an oath acts somehow outside the testifier’s discourse, 
but it is, in any case, a very institutionalized setting which requires a more profound reflection.  
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their argumentative uses should not bear on the distinction fiction/nonfiction as a 
primary criterion.  
 
5. NARRATION AS ARGUMENT 
 
Now, there would be a number of widely acknowledged argument types in which 
narratives may be involved in significant ways. Arguments from example (Walton, 
Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 314) and from analogy, especially “practical reasoning 
from analogy” (ibid., pp. 315-316), are the first obvious choices and have been so 
recognized ever since Aristotle’s account of the rather confused conglomerate he 
gathers under the label paradeigma, including narratives taken from real events, 
fables and parables (Ret. 1393a27-1394a18). Arguments from precedent (Walton, 
Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 344) could also belong within this group. In these cases, 
the speaker introduces a story which does not have to contain anything that is 
particularly in question in the given situation. Through the development of the 
argument, the speaker should show how such secondary, digressive, stories relate to 
the conclusion, claim, or position she is aiming at. Sometimes this is fully expressed, 
as in the classical fables’ morals and sometimes it is left to the audience to draw. 
Plumer’s account of novel as a kind of implicit analogical argument counts on this 
second possibility.  
Now, the question is whether there is anything characteristic of narration 
which makes narrative “arguments from example” or “from analogy” different from 
other such arguments. For Govier & Ayers (2012), it is finally their characteristic 
weakness in epistemological terms, as providing not-so-good reasons for their 
claims. Traditional rhetorical accounts emphasized, instead, the persuasive virtues 
of vividness (evidentia/enargeia),33 which obtains a peculiarly strong kind of 
personal commitment from the audience. This idea has been recovered in modern 
models of deliberative assessment where the degree of “narrativity” of a collective 
argumentative discussion is even seen as an index of effective participation 
(Steffensmeier, 2008).34 From the perspective I have been developing here, the main 
characteristic of these narrative-based arguments would have to do with the 
peculiar and highly naturalized way we assess the narrative plausibility of stories as 
coherent wholes and the centrality, within our cognitive resources, of such a 
capacity. Fisher’s narrative model of rationality (1987) could well be at the basis of 
                                                        
33 Quintilian (2001), Inst. or., IV.2.64.: “Others add vividness, in Greek called enargeia […] As to 
vividness, it is, to my understanding, undoubtedly an important virtue of narrative, when a truth 
requires not only to be told but in a sense to be presented to the sight” (“Sunt qui adiciant his 
evidentiam, quae enargeia Graece vocatur […] evidentia in narratione, quantum ego intellego, est 
quidem magna virtus, cum quid veri non dicendum sed quodammodo etiam ostendendum est.”) 
34 Steffensmeier adds “narrativity” to other criteria proposed by Steiner et al. (2004) for deliberative 
Discourse Quality Index (DQI) such as open participation, sufficient justification of claims, 
consideration of common good, respectful treatment of others or effective achievement of a 
rationally motivated consensus. The same idea was recently presented by C.R. Lee and J. Burnside-
Lawry, in Copenhagen’s Conference “Rhetoric in Society 4” (January 15-18, 2013), with a paper called 
“Voice, listening, and telling stories: the communicative construction of rhetorical citizenship in small 
groups” in which they claimed that “narrative helps people enact rhetorical citizenship”. 
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it, but we certainly need an argumentative theory of narrative probabilitas made in 
terms of our modern theories of argumentation.35 
When facts themselves are under discussion or are unknown to the audience 
and someone has the contextually acknowledged mission of giving a plausible 
account of them, we will be dealing with primary or core narratives (“which contain 
just the case and the whole reason for a dispute.”)36 Still it may well be in a situation 
were either the same person (as in ancient legal procedures) or someone else (as in 
modern ones) is formally required to use the material exposed in a subsequent 
explicitly argumentative discourse, allegedly “coherent with the statement”. In these 
cases, although the narrative part should undoubtedly have argumentative virtues 
(in the sense of being adequately “preparatory”), the audience and especially those 
who have their own significant and decisive mission in the procedure (namely juries 
and judges) will count on the explicit arguments to assess their position. Here, in 
addition to narrative plausibility, we should also take into account the particulars of 
arguments from testimony or from a position to know (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 
2008, pp. 309-310).37 
Narration, purely narration as argument with no other recognized “argument 
scheme” associated, in the case we admit it as complying with our pragmatic terms, 
would be the matter of discursive genres such as history, biography or journalism 
(which, of course, may also include, explicit arguments). In them, under the 
adequate circumstances, we may be able to conceive the statement of facts 
‒presented with the contextually acknowledged intention of obtaining the 
audience’s adherence (fides)‒ as conveying an implicit meta-argument about the 
coincidence between discourse and reality via their own internal plausibility. The 
story’s veracity would be the suggested conclusion and its justificatory measure, just 
its manifest narrative plausibility. 
Now, not all narratives would be delivered in a pragmatic context which may 
easily allow their (interesting) argumentative assessment. In his classificatory 
paragraph (De inv. I.27) about narratio, in addition to those we have here called 
primary and secondary narratives, Cicero allows for a third type which does not have 
to do with rhetoric ‒which, for him, is the art of civic discourse‒: “The third kind is 
wholly unconnected with public issues, which is recited or written solely for 
amusement but, at the same time, provides valuable training.”38 And yet, as we see, 
he finally admits its pedagogical rhetorical interest, at least as exercise in narrative 
skills. If those who call our species homo narrans are right, this is in fact something 
                                                        
35 T.A. Hollihan and K.T. Baaske’s textbook on argumentation theory (1994; 22005) is allegedly based 
on Fisher’s narrative paradigm. Yet, this does not reflect so much in its content, beyond chapter 2, in 
which such paradigm is clearly explained and developed. In particular, it does not reflect at all in the 
types of argument contemplated. 
36 “in quo ipsa causa et omnis ratio controversiae continetur”, Cicero (1976), De inv., I.27. 
37 I have dealt with testimony elsewhere (Olmos, 2007; 2008).  
38 Cicero (1976), De inv., I.27.: “Tertium genus est remotun a civilibus causis, quod delectationis causa 
non inutili cum exercitatione dicitur et scribitur”. 
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we keep doing since the moment we are born. We learn to narrate, to listen to 
narratives, to assess their plausibility and use it in infinite ways. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
M. Carel (2012) has recently tried to show that the distinction between 
argumentation and narration is not so easy to make at a merely linguistic (syntactic 
or semantic) level. From the point of view of the ADL approach which she embraces, 
she finally concludes that it is only in their “enunciative mode” (having to do, 
especially with the speaker´s position with respect to the contents) that these types 
of discourse are finally distinguishable.  This is one among many studies within the 
sphere of argumentation theory which are today trying to explore the not-so-clear 
boundaries between argumentative and narrative discourse. Here, we have chosen a 
more pragmatic setting to assess the substantial and characteristic contribution of 
narrative discourse to argument in at least two possible senses. First, as part of a 
complex interchange in which eventually explicit arguments will be exposed, which 
allegedly do not exactly work in the same way as similar non-narrative argument 
schemes. Second, and more interestingly, within a context in which, there being 
facts under discussion, the only visible support or evidence presented for a certain 
version of them, would be the manifest plausibility of the narrative sequence. 
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